


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In this edition we present a good variety of topics from ancient coins to the 20th century. We welcome Richard Plant to our pages with an educational article on crusader coins and how to read them. Richard is a well recognized author having written extensively for the numismatic press in England and has several books published on Greek, Roman and Arabic coins. Joe Boling contributes an article on a political countermark on Indian coins which augments Greg Brunk's project to catalog political countermarks (Greg's series appears in the NI Bulletin). Jorge Proctor and your editor present a history of the 1655 Cartagena mint, which has long been a mystery of Latin American Numismatics. Peter Horvitz writes on a Spanish Civil War token. Mark McMenamin offers observations about some disputed Carthaginian coins. I hope you read and enjoy the work of all these writers.

Please be sure to read the back cover to see acknowledgements for the best articles of 2011.

Herman Blanton

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The Illegal Mint Office of Cartagena, 1655
Jorge A. Proctor, NI #2732 and Herman Blanton, NI #LM115
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Having previously consulted one another on various topics we now take this opportunity to jointly present what we hope is a useful contribution to Latin American numismatic studies. We intend to lift the veil of mystery concerning the Cartagena coins of 1655, which are known to exist in silver denominations from 1/2 real to 8 real; a 1/4 real may exist yet awaits discovery. In this article we mention a special production at Cartagena in 1629; we will elaborate on this subject in a future article.

A minting license was awarded by King Philip III of Spain in 1620 to Alonso Turrillo de Yebra to establish and operate a mint in Santa Fe de Bogotá and a mint office in Cartagena of the Indies. Both of these cities are today in the Republic of Colombia. Even though the Cartagena facility was not a fully authorized mint it produced a full complement of Spanish coins from 1/4 real to 2 escudo and as a result it is today frequently referred to as a mint. The Cartagena facility was officially closed in 1635 but we know of coins dated 1655 that are attributed to Cartagena. The numismatic riddle of coins dated 1655 and attributed to Cartagena of the Indies can be said to have been proposed in 1929 when for the first time (at least the first appearance known to us) a 1655 coin from Cartagena made a public appearance. This is a riddle since the Cartagena mint closed in 1635 there should not be any coins with a date later than 1635. In the auction catalog by Edgar H. Adams of *The Julius Gutttag Collection of Latin American Coins* in 1929 lot 1186 was illustrated and described.



1655. Eight Reales. Philip IV. Santa Fe de Bogota mint. [1, MCM]

Attributing this specimen to Santa Fe is actually very good considering that this was apparently a totally unknown type at the time and numismatic references to a mint at Cartagena were scant at best. In 1953 F. Xavier Calicó wrote a brilliant thesis concerning coins of Santa Fe de Bogotá in which he proposed that this very coin and a similar four real coin were made at Cartagena (Calicó: 29-30). Despite Calicó's thesis at least as late as 1965 this coin was still being attributed to Santa Fe (Yriarte).

The *Banco de la República* (Bank of the Republic of Colombia) published two authoritative books concerning the mint history of Santa Fe and Cartagena (Friede: 1963 and Barriga: 1969). Both of these are essential references for the researcher but neither contains the solution to the Cartagena 1655 riddle. By 1970 the 1655 dated eight real was finally being cataloged under Cartagena albeit the 1635 and earlier coins were misattributed to Cuenca and Santa Fe (Calbetó).

Further progress has since been made through observations and theories by various authors, most notably Joseph Lasser. Lasser posed five unanswered questions in his article “The Cobs of Cartagena, 1622-1655” (Lasser). In this present article in addition to telling the history of the 1655 coins we intend to partly or completely answer three of his five questions: 1) Regarding missing records for production at Cartagena; 3) Who were the assayers at Cartagena?; 5) Why have we not been able to identify pieces other than 1655 from the latter Cartagena mint production?

As the reader will see the 1655 mint was a totally new mint not associated with Turrillo’s mint in any way other than by historical precedent.

Our history begins nine years after the closure of the Cartagena mint office in 1635. On 3 October 1644 the City Council of Cartagena wrote to the King of Spain to express a strong sentiment about the loss of its mint office, which they were now requesting to be reopened. As part of this request the King was informed of the bad situation at Cartagena due to the lack of commerce between the provinces, the lack of mines in the vicinity and, most importantly, the loss of its minting facility. (AGI: SANTA FE, 63, N. 112.)

The Council of the Indies examined the merits of Cartagena’s request. They gathered documentation pertaining to the mint’s activities up to 1635, and accepted information provided to them by the House of Trade (*Casa de Contratación*). After reviewing the matter they decreed on 2 May 1645 that the orders that had already been put in place, which prevented Cartagena from reopening its mint office, would continue to remain in place. (AGI: SANTA FE, 63, N. 117.)

While this was going on, a scandal was brewing in Peru. On 12 April 1644, Don Andrés de Ferrera, Leading Assayer in Spain (*Ensayador Mayor del Reino*), sent correspondence to the President of the Council of Finance (*Consejo de Hacienda*) to inform him that it had been observed that certain coinage coming from the Indies was underweight and did not meet the purity specifications. He sought the creation of an investigative commission to operate in secret with the purpose of identifying and ending the fraud.

By 1647 the news of the debasement of the silver coinage from Potosí, in the Viceroyalty of Peru, had spread throughout Spain and to other countries. The scandal could no longer be kept secret. On 30 August 1647, King Philip IV of Spain appointed Dr. Francisco de Nestares Marín as President of the Audiencia of Charcas (today La Plata) (AGI: CONTRATACION, 5793, L. 2, F. 688V-690V), and gave him, that same year, a commission to conduct a full investigation on the Potosí mint to resolve what had now become an embarrassment to Spain (AGI: CHARCAS, 416, L. 4, F. 89R-90R).

During his investigation, which began in early 1648, Francisco de Nestares Marín discovered that the entire minting operation in Potosí had become compromised, with fraud extending from the mines to the mint. Many city officials were ordered to be removed from office in 1649. With these findings in hand death sentences were also issued against several other officials, namely: two former treasurers, Francisco Ximénez de Cervantes and Miguel Ruiz, the rich merchant and former city mayor Francisco Gómez de la Rocha and the mint assayer Felipe Ramírez de Arellano (assayer from 1646 to 1648). Later, orders would be issued for the arrest of Gerónimo Velásquez, assayer for a short period in 1646, and the removal of the current mint assayer Pedro Zambrano, who had been working the post since July of 1648. (Zambrano was ordered to be replaced by Don Juan Rodríguez de Rodas, an assayer who had been sent from Spain to take over the post.)

Following the scandal and its ensuing investigation King Philip IV issued a decree (*pragmática*) in Spain on 1 October 1650. In the decree he ordered the debased Peruvian money arriving in Spain be gathered and smelted, being devalued at the rate of 5 reals for each 8 real coin, to be redeemed in Mexican or Spanish silver coins or 8 reals in maravedis (Spanish currency unit), and half of that for the 4 real. A period of two months was allowed for bringing these coins to the local mint to be smelted and re-struck into new coins. If re-striking was not possible at the time, then the requirement to bring these coins to the mint would still remain in place, in which case the coins were to be cut to prevent their usage. To encourage the inhabitants of Spain to comply with this order they were told that the *señoraje* (a tax on smelted silver) would be waived and that the Royal Treasury would assume full responsibility for absorbing any further costs. The decree ended with a stiff penalty for those who disobeyed the order. After the two months had elapsed no one could continue to use the Peruvian coins under penalty of confiscation of their silver and a sentence of two years of exile (that is, unless the coins had been cut and registered, in which case they could still be remitted to be re-struck). This decree was extended until 24 March 1651, after which date the circulation of Peruvian 8 and 4 real coins in Spain became illegal and the penalties established in the law began to take effect.

By 22 December 1650, with a better understanding of the actual loss in silver that was being incurred per coin, King Philip IV now signed a new decree to be sent to the Indies. The debased Peruvian coins would now be devalued to new rates; the 8 real coin valued at 6 reals, or 12 reals in maravedis, and the 4 real to 3 reals each. As with the previous order, these coins had to be taken to the mint to be re-struck although the cost of smelting and re-striking would be incurred by the owner of the coins. Recognizing that there was no way to differentiate the coins minted before and after the Nestares Marín investigation, it was now mandated that the mints in the Viceroyalty of Peru start minting (silver) coins with a new design. The new design requirement was to place the arms of Castile and León on one side and two columns on the other with the motto *Plus Ultra* in-between the columns.

...ordeno la forma del cuño fuerte que no imite del de hasta aora sino que por la una parte se pongan las armas de Castilla y León y por la otra dos columnas con el Plus Ultra en medio procurando que no sean relevadas y también sea de poner el año, la casa y el nombre del ensayador con gran

distinción y claridad de manera que se pueda leer advirtiéndose se estampe muy bien los sellos de la moneda de suerte que se reconozca por ambas partes pues esto es tan conveniente para que tenga diferencia de las de antes...

The decree outlined the requirements and expectations and told that since Spain could not anticipate the difficulties that could be caused by the implementation of the decree, its recipient, in the case of its Viceroy, was to consult with its local *Audiencia*, Archbishop and commission of the Royal Treasury (*Junta de Hacienda*). If they saw the need to delay announcing these orders they were to send a detailed report of everything discussed but if they were to find that there were no obstacles then to continue with the promulgation and execution of the decree.

On 17 April 1651 the King sent a letter to Nestares Marín where he and the *Audiencias* of Lima and Charcas were asked to provide their views on whether the Potosí mint should be moved; a move that never went past its proposed stage. Nestares Marín was instructed that for the time being the Potosí mint could strike only the quantity of coins necessary for the local commerce and not to send the silver back to Spain in the form of coins, but only in the form of bars (*...disponiendo la Cantidad que se a de Labrar cada año en la dicha casa [de moneda de Potosí] se límite precisamente a la que fuera necesaria para el comercio y no mas y la plata que hubiere de venir a estos Reinos sea en barras y no en moneda...*). (AGI: CHARCAS, 416, L. 4, F. 161V-165R.)

But, with the news of what had been done in Spain already well known in Peru and the decree of 22 December 1650 still on its way, a new concern was raised in that the orders did not differentiate between coins, only allowing for one debased value, and yet it was known that there were different coins circulating with different states of debasement.

In September of 1651 Don Juan de Velarde, Advisor to the Royal Court of Lima, still concerned with the situation regarding what coins needed to be devalued under the orders from the King, wrote to Nestares Marín. He argued that it was better to delay implementing the decree sent by the King, once it arrived, until His Majesty could be made aware of the injustice of placing the same devaluation on coins made under different circumstances (referring to the debased coins prior to 1649 and the new coins minted since 1649). Velarde claimed that it was difficult to differentiate the coins from these two periods, indicating that of 130,000 pesos minted since 1649, that had been checked, not one was found to have a clear date, not to mention that the coins minted before and after 1649 all had the same design. (Cunietti-Ferrando, Craig trans.: 89-90.)

It is interesting to note that the Nestares Marín investigation had already discovered problems with the weight and fineness of the coins minted after 1649, although not as severe as the previous coins. Velarde also proposed that to avoid fraud and confusion the coins should be counterstamped with two adornments; a small imperial crown in the middle of the cross of Castile and León (on the reverse side) and with the identifying mark and assayer initial for the treasury where the coin was counterstamped on the other side (*...un resello o contramarca que podría consistir “de dos aces, poniendo en la una, una corona imperial pequeña en medio de la cruz*

del castillo y león, y en la otra la señal de la caxa y letra del ensaiador.”). (Cunietti-Ferrando 1995:159, AGI: Lima, 168.)

The Count of Salvatierra, Viceroy of Peru, received the decree of 22 December 1650 on 6 January 1652 and with Nestares Marín’s investigation still ongoing and questions raised on the impact that this decree would cause to local commerce, the Viceroy delayed announcing the decree while a more suitable implementation could be found.

On 7 January 1652 the Viceroy, the Count of Salvatierra, formed a commission in Lima to discuss when and how the orders from the King would be applied in the Viceroyalty of Peru. The commission concluded on 29 January 1652 reporting to the Viceroy that it was their opinion that the coins with the new design mandated on 22 December 1650 should be minted from here forward. They further advised that a counterstamp should be placed on the coins with the old design, (shield and cross) minted since 1649, to avoid distrust and to differentiate these from the other coins. The counterstamp was to be applied in the foundry of Lima and the foundries of other cities under the authority of the Peruvian Viceroyalty. (Medina: 214-15 where it says 1653, but this date is erroneous as he states that after this event, the order was proclaimed on 31 January 1652.)

The Viceroy issued the public announcement of the decree of 22 December 1650 on 31 January 1652, adding that the 8 and 4 reals minted during the tenure of Pedro de Toledo, Marquis of Mancera and previous Viceroy of Peru, up to 1648, would now be worth 6 and 3 reals respectively, and that the 8 and 4 reals minted from 1649 to the present would be worth 7-1/2 and 3-3/4 reals. But having two debased values was not the only adaptation made to the decree from 22 December 1650 by the Viceroy. Whereas the decree’s main objective was to rapidly eliminate the circulation of the debased coinage of Peru, the Viceroy was now allowing for both these devalued coins to continue circulating for a period of eight months; for which he was authorizing a counterstamp be placed on the coins minted between 1649 and 1652 to differentiate these coins from the others thus eliminating confusion. The approval of the continued circulation of these coins was said to be done so that if there were not enough small denomination coins in circulation during the first eight months of production of the new coins, these could help to supplement the economy and with these orders now in place, the instructions were sent to other *Audiencias* such as La Plata, Quito, Panama and Chile for immediate execution. The new coins started to be minted in Potosí on 11 March 1652, and before the eight months had elapsed, the Viceroy set the new date of 13 September 1652 as the date when the circulation of the coins minted prior to 1649 would cease. As for the order to allow the circulation of the counterstamped coins, this was extended over and over again, for additional eight month periods, until 30 April 1657.

***Nuevo Reino de Granada* (New Kingdom of Granada) and the Decree of 22 December 1650**

Carrying the King’s decree of 22 December 1650, the Fleet of Don Pedro de Ursúa left the port of Cadiz, Spain on 13 June 1651 and arrived in the port of Cartagena in late August or early September 1651.

Don Juan Fernández de Córdoba y Coalla, the Marquis of Miranda de Auta, Governor and Captain General of Nuevo Reino de Granada and President of the *Audiencia* of Santa Fe immediately received both the decree of 22 December 1650 and a copy of the orders announced in Spain by the instructions of the decree of 1 October 1650. Being told to examine what possible difficulties could be caused by the implementation of this decree, the Marquis arranged a General Committee with the justices (*Oidores*) of his *Audiencia* in Santa Fe. They quickly moved forward with the execution of the King's instructions, ordering the mint of Santa Fe to immediately start production of the coins with the new design; coins which started being minted in Santa Fe that same year of 1651 with the mark of assayer Pedro Ramos.

On a letter dated 22 September 1651 at Cartagena, under the government of Field Marshall Don Fernando de la Riva Agüero, Knight of the Order of St. James, Governor and Captain General of the Province of Cartagena, reported having proclaimed the orders regarding the debased Peruvian coins. They allowed the coins to circulate at their debased value of 6 reales per each 8 real and 3 reales per each 4 real, for a short time, most likely not to exceed the same two months allowed in Spain for the removal of these coins, after which period, at great loss to Cartagena, they could not circulate at any value. Commercial transactions would continue to be performed using 1 and 2 real coins and *rieles* (rails, straps) of silver known as *barretones* (produced from the smelting of the debased coins, which once taxed and marked could circulate as currency with a value in accordance to their weight and fineness). (AGI: SANTA FE, 42, R.5, N. 101.)



**16 lb silver *barretón* from the 1622 wreck of the *Nuestra Señora de Atocha*
Treasure Salvor's ingot 923: 351×67×32mm [2]**

With the proclamation of the decree of 22 December 1650 in Cartagena, they immediately turned to the General Committee established in Santa Fe for the study of this subject, requesting (that for the time they deemed necessary) to approve the reopening of the mint office in Cartagena, or that the mint of Santa Fe strike a quantity of coins with the new design, considerable enough to be of help to them. But neither of these requests were approved as the *Audiencia* of Santa Fe determined that the right to mint coins was the prerogative of the King, who was the only one who could grant it, and as for enough coins being minted in Santa Fe for use in Cartagena, it was said that there was no possible way to mint enough coins for the entire Kingdom of Nuevo Reino due to the small amount of pure silver available for mixing with the *rieles* of low silver produced from the smelting of the coins; that coupled with a lack of lead used for refining would carry a tremendous cost.

With this response, and after waiting a year, Cartagena sent a request in 1652 to the King asking permission to open the mint office. They hoped he would grant their request once he understood their predicament.

After taking into consideration the request from Cartagena it was decreed on 15 February 1653 that the Cartagena mint office should not be opened and this order was remitted to Cartagena in the Galleons of the Armada Commanded by Captain General Don Juan de Echeverri, Marquis of Villarrubia de Langre, which departed Cadiz on 22 November 1653.

On 20 March 1654 Field Marshall Don Pedro Zapata de Mendoza, Knight of the Order of St. James, Governor and Captain General of the Province of Cartagena and its city since 10 January 1654, wrote to the King to let him know that for the past few years the city of Cartagena was suffering the worst of calamities. The residents and the treasury suffered mostly due to the debasement of the Peruvian coins, which had been removed from circulation throughout the city and the entire area under the jurisdiction of the *Audiencia* of Santa Fe. Having to now endure a shortage of coins for commerce and food purchases their only recourse was to tolerate the suffering, afflictions and hopelessness caused by the total prohibition against circulating the old Peruvian coins of 4 and 8 reals, with or without being counterstamped.

With this introduction, the Governor expressed the troubles being experienced in Cartagena, and pointed out that the coins minted since 1649, which after being counterstamped, were still circulating in Peru at their reduced value of 7-1/2 reals per each 8 real; he heard that this practice enabled fraud, since these counterstamps were so easy to counterfeit, many of the older coins that were to be destroyed were also illegally being countermarked. As for the coins with the new design, he also stated that although more than two years had passed since these coins started to be minted in Santa Fe, it being the closest mint to Cartagena, at a distance of more than 300 leagues, not only had they not sent a single coin to Cartagena, but also, not a single coin with the new design could be seen in Cartagena. This situation was aggravated when dispatching the galleons because the governor had to collect the money needed for this from the inhabitants of the city, as well as foreigners. This was a large requirement and with such few legal coins available caused many problems, of which the Marquis of Villarrubia, current commander of the Armada of the Guard now in Cartagena with his fleet, could attest to. After pointing out the many problems he requested that they be allowed to reopen the mint office, asking that if they saw any disadvantage in making this permanent, that they would at least allot them a period of three to four years to ensure that the province was provided with the quantity of coins needed.

Only four days after writing the letter above, and after examining the previous denial from the King, which arrived that same year of 1654 with the fleet of Don Juan de Echeverri, Marquis of Villarrubia de Langre, the governor must have felt that his previous letter was not strong enough and he needed to take more drastic action. On 24 March 1654, Governor Zapata convened a meeting of important officials serving in Cartagena and others who happened to be in Cartagena at the time, and also of clergyman, to discuss the matter and send a copy of their findings to the King. With this the Governor put more weight into his request and hoped to more favorably

influence the King's decision. On 31 March 1654, the committee was in place, being composed of the following men:

Don Juan Fernández de Córdoba and Coalla Marquis of Miranda de Auta	Captain General and Governor of Santa Fe and President of its <i>Audiencia</i>
Don Juan de Echeverri Marquis of Villarrubia de Langre	Captain General of the Armada of the Guard of the Indies
Don Antonio de Calatayud	<i>Oidor</i> (Judge) of the <i>Audiencia</i> of Lima
Doctor Don Pedro de Salas y Pedroso	Inquisitor of the Tribunal of the Inquisition of Cartagena
Don Diego de Baños y Sotomayor	<i>Oidor</i> of the <i>Audiencia</i> of the Nuevo Reino of Granada
Field Marshall Don Fernando de la Riva Agüero	Former Governor of the Province of Cartagena
Don Juan de Salazar	Former Governor of the Province of Popayán
Don Isidro de Villalobos Sarmiento	Accountant of the Accounting Tribunal of Santa Fe, who was serving in Cartagena
Diego Muñoz de Padilla	Accountant of the Accounting Tribunal of Santa Fe
Don Pedro de Estrada	Accountant of the Royal Treasury of the Province and city of Cartagena
Antonio Farfán de los Godos	Treasurer of the Royal Treasury of the Province and city of Cartagena
Factor Diego Radillo de Arce	Clerk (or agent) of the Royal Treasury of the Province and city of Cartagena
Admiral Don Pedro Nuñez de Villavicencio	Admiral of the Galleons of the Colonial Convoy System (<i>Carrera de Indias</i>)
Don Félix Garcí-González de León	Governor of the <i>Tercio</i>
Captain Juan de Somovilla Tejada	Military engineer serving as Deputy Alderman named by the City Council of Cartagena
<i>Licenciado</i> Antonio Fernández de Girón	Dean of the Holy Church, <i>Sede Vacante</i>
Father Master Fray Alonso de la Bandera	Provincial of the Order of St. Dominic
Fray Esteban de Echaburu	Provincial of the Order of St. Francis
Fray Juan Ortiz Nieto	Deputy General Commissioner of the Order of St. Francis
Fray Pedro Ludeña	Provisional Vicar of the Orden of St. Agustín
Father Juan de Arcos	Rector of the <i>Colegio de la Compañía de Jesús</i> in Cartagena

On this date, Governor Zapata presented his petition to the committee, requesting they either approve the circulation of the counterstamped coins in Cartagena or to allow the mint office to be opened; after receiving his petition they started deliberation. The governor understood that each option carried pros and cons, but either way he needed a solution to the dilemma. The day concluded without a

decision. As it turned out, the committee expressed its need for information from stakeholders in the city, so that with proper representation, each person could tell their most important and pressing need; once the committee had this information the situation could be better understood and they could deliberate and judge how to be of most service to His Majesty.

During the 1st and 2nd of April 1654, the Attorney General (*Procurador*) and City Council (*Cabildo*) gathered a list of witnesses and conducted proceedings after which they provided the statements and papers gathered to the Committee on 3 April 1654. On that same day the committee met again in the house of Governor Zapata. Although they did seem to be in favor of the opening of the mint office, they concluded their arguments by saying that the matter was a royal prerogative and as such they could not resolve or determine to give their opinion in just saying that the mint should be opened, without first consulting His Majesty and the members of His Council of the Indies. Although not exactly what Governor Zapata must have been hoping for, the decision was strong enough to possibly serve the purpose of what Zapata wanted to achieve. On 4 April 1654 he wrote a new letter to the King, stating that although the committee unanimously acknowledged the problems faced by the city, as he had previously explained, they all had doubts regarding what solution should be taken, as they neither agreed to allow counterstamped Peruvian coins to circulate in Cartagena nor could they find the authority to open the mint office. (AGI: SANTA FE, 42, R. 5, N. 101.)

On 18 June 1654 the letters of 20 March and 4 April, 1654, sent by Governor Zapata, in addition to all other documents and statements collected during the proceedings of the Attorney General, the City Council and the committee arrived in Spain on the fleet of the Marquis of Villarrubia de Langre. Reviewed by the Council of the Indies on 21 July 1654 where they decided that they would study again all the reason given for the initial closure of the mint office and all matters regarding the subject so that a resolution could be made. (*Estas cartas y papeles se vieron en el consejo en 21 de julio de 1654 y se decreto lo siguiente: júntese los motivos que hubo para extinguir la casa de moneda de Cartagena y todo lo que hubiere en razón de esto y tráigase relación.*) (AGI: SANTA FE, 42, R. 5, N. 101.)

Unbeknown to Governor Zapata, by September of 1654 a decision had already been made to his request, but, with this decision slow to arrive back in Cartagena and now hearing the news of the siege of Santo Domingo by the English Commonwealth (a siege which was fought between April 23 to April 30, 1655), Governor Zapata became impatient, and on 18 May 1655 he again gathered former presidents, justices, governors and generals who were present in Cartagena at the time. With the galleons of the Armada of the Marquis of Montealegre now in the port of Cartagena, Governor Zapata convened a committee (names are not recorded in the document) to make a decision on what should be done about the mint office, and the committee members voted to continue forward with the project. By June of 1655 Governor Zapata, still concerned in the manner that the office should be established, requested for Manuel de Escalante y Mendoza, attorney general (*Fiscal*) of the *Audiencia* of Mexico, to be by his side to assist him. After much deliberation with this official and others, and studying the laws, decided that if the project was to continue forward the office needed to be reestablished (*reedificada*) and not merely opened as was done by Don

Fadrique de Toledo, who is said to have opened the mint office in 1629, without a license, to assist his Armada. With this decision on 9 June 1655 Governor Zapata ordered for the mint office to be reestablished with limitations, in the residence of Captain Alonso Cuadrado Cid. The initial intent was said to be to mint silver coins in regular denominations to aid the galleons of the Armada of the Marquis of Montealegre, which was said to have had a large quantity of debased silver from the Potosí scandal, among other things.

The governor ordered for the titles of the different officials at this mint facility to be issued in their respective official papers. This order is dated 10 June 1655.

Juan de Somovilla Tejada*	Treasurer
Tomás Perosso	Chief Guard (<i>Guarda Mayor</i>)
Salvador de Cáceres	Assayer
Alejos de Reina	Diesinker
Don Manuel de Somovilla Tejada (Son of Juan de Somovilla Tejada)	Weigh Master
Lorenzo de Soto	Scribe
Miguel Serrano	Smelter
Manuel Carrillo	Supervisor (mentioned elsewhere)

* Member of 1654 committee.

Besides the officials above mentioned, the documents also indicate that work crew supervisors (*capataces*) and coiners (*acuñadores*) were also named. But it does not provide their names.

The mint office of Cartagena started coin production on 21 June 1655, the date documented by Lorenzo de Soto, scribe of the mint office, who indicated that on this date the first batch of silver (*enrielada*) was received by the supervisor Manuel Carrillo from the treasurer. Both Governor Zapata and the City Council of Cartagena on 1 and 2 July 1655, respectively, wrote to the King to inform him of the reestablishment of the mint office in their city. They expressed that the establishment of the mint office had become necessary due to the decreased value of the coinage minted in Peru and the difficulty in spending the Peruvian money which was causing many problems. This issue became worse day by day, and was now impeding commerce between the city and the Armada of the Marquis of Montealegre (such as provisioning and recruiting). So now, without being able to proceed one way or the other without a resolution, Don Pedro Zapata, as governor, met with the General of the Armada (which must have been the Marquis himself as he had returned from Portobelo, Panamá, on 10 May 1655) and with other members of His Majesty's service who were present in the city on this occasion and they agreed that the best recourse was to reopen the mint office. The hope of these communications was not only to inform the King of the decision to reestablish this mint office, but that after the King was able to see and examine all the orders and papers sent by the governor with his letter, that he would agree to retain the office in operation for a period that would be of most benefit to his service, especially taking into consideration that the city was the most frequented port that His Majesty had in the Indies. At a minimum they hoped for a period necessary to consume the silver bars made with the bad coinage of Peru, as without these means it would be impossible to utilize this silver in

commerce or to overcome the obstacles this was causing. (AGI: SANTA FE, 42, R. 5, N. 99 & SANTA FE, 63, N. 126.)

While these multiple correspondences were on their way to Spain, and unbeknown to the officials of Cartagena, Captain Marcos del Puerto had departed the port of Cadiz on 27 May 1655 in route to Cartagena. He carried a Royal Decree from King Philip IV of Spain, dated 26 September 1654, in which the King ordered the mint office in Cartagena not to be reopened, no matter what excuse was given, and that if it had been opened, to close it down immediately. Don Isidro the Villalobos Sarmiento, Accountant of the City of Cartagena, confirmed that Captain Marcos del Puerto arrived in Cartagena on 5 July 1655 with the King's decree and this was presented to Governor Zapata the following day, 6 July 1655, just three days after the Armada of Montealegre departed Cartagena. With this explicit instruction from the King now in hand, the governor proceeded to issue a public announcement to let it be known that the mint office would be closed. Following this announcement, orders were issued on 9 July 1655 instructing Treasurer Juan de Somovilla Tejada to gather, within six days, all the dies and instruments, lock them up in a box, and store them in the warehouses of the Royal Treasury of the city under the guidance of the Treasury officials.

These orders were received by Treasurer Somovilla Tejada on 14 July 1655 and with this task completed, Governor Zapata, still concerned with the actions he had taken, which now he knew for sure were against the King's desires, immediately wrote to the King on 16 July 1655 to explain how the decision was made to reestablish the mint. He now asked for understanding explaining that he had gathered committees and as such it was not an arbitrary decision, and claimed that the mint was now closed after minting not more than 17,000 pesos worth of coins, or about 2,000 marks of silver. (The mark is about 230 grams.) But the office was not really closed yet. Even though the orders to close down the mint office, received by Treasurer Somovilla Tejada on 14 July 1655, were clear, the treasurer did not take immediate action as instructed, and instead, on 24 July 1655 he requested a period of another two months, so that, as he explained, he could coin the silver belonging to some city residents (*partiulares*), which was said to have already been smelted and made into planchets (coin blanks).

The governor received Juan de Somovilla's request to extend the period of mint production. Although he did not approve the request he did concede to a compromise. He approved an extra 15 days for continuing the coin production, and then increased this amount of time to 21 days total, which were to start retroactively from 14 July 1655, the date when Juan de Somovilla had received the initial order to close down the mint office. With this new order in place, Juan de Somovilla was now given the new deadline of 4 August 1655 to close down the mint office of Cartagena.

Now, at the same time that this was going on in Cartagena, the letters that Governor Zapata and the City Council had sent to the King arrived in Spain, and they must have caused quite a reaction, as the Governor's orders to reestablish the mint office in Cartagena were completely opposite to what the King desired. Spain called for a committee on 3 November 1655 to examine all the documents sent by Governor Zapata. This committee was composed of Count Don Juan González, Don Fadrique

Enriquez, Don José Pardo, Don Juan Antonio and Don Juan Altamirano. The committee determined that although the reasons that had been given by Governor Zapata to reestablish the mint office were in fact grave, they did not provide enough reason, be that by cause or accident, to reopen the mint without the direct orders from the Council of the Indies, who alone can determine what is most suitable in the matter. (AGI: SANTA FE, 42, R. 5, N. 101.)

By letter dated 20 January 1656 the King of Spain reprimanded Governor Pedro Zapata for having opened the mint office and ordered that this facility not be reopened again without explicit orders from the Council of the Indies.

With the Governor already in the hot seat after the news of his disobedience of the King's orders regarding the opening of the mint office of Cartagena, and Spain eager to know more about the activities carried out by this mint office during the period that it had been in operation, the Governor now gathered as much documentation as he could. On 24 April 1656 he wrote to the King of Spain again to discuss his participation on the establishment of the mint office, the precedence he followed to do so, and claimed that this had been closed after minting just about 3,000 marks of silver (or about 1,000 Marks more than he had previously claimed on 16 July 1655); this figure, none the less, would come to be contested in a later investigation. (SANTA FE, 42, R.5, N. 101.)

Investigation

Spain studied the matter, which would not soon be forgotten. On 29 August 1657 the King sent a letter to Santa Fe requesting that information be provided to the Council of the Indies regarding what was the state of the Treasury of Cartagena and its accounting figures. To this, Santa Fe reported that Cartagena had its figures current up to 1650, but that for the following six years, these were being delayed.

On 13 April 1658 the King ordered Don Juan Abelló de Valdés, Attorney General of the House of Trade in Seville (*Fiscal de la Casa de la Contratación*), to conduct an investigation on Governor Zapata. This request was made by instruction from Doctor Antonio de Felonga, Attorney General of the Council of the Indies. By 22 April of that same year the King added to Abelló de Valdés' investigation, that of the Treasuries of Cartagena and Panama.

On 30 April 1658 Juan Abelló de Valdés received the new title of Criminal Judge for the Chancery of Valladolid (*Alcalde del Crimen de la Chancillería de Valladolid*), being sworn into this title on 20 May 1658. He departed Spain on 5 June 1658 on the fleet of the Marquis of Villarrubia, arriving in Cartagena on 13 July 1658. He started his investigation on 19 July 1658, for which among the charges being examined were that the mint had remained opened for some time after the order had been received to close it down, and that frauds had been committed on the salvage of the *Nuestra Señora de las Maravillas* (the *Almiranta* [vessel in charge of bringing up the rear] of the 1654-1656 fleet of the Marquis of Montealegre, which was lost on 4 January of 1656 in *Los Mimbres*, now known as Mantilla Shoal in Bahamas).

As part of this investigation, on 7 September 1659, Juan Abelló de Valdés sent a preliminary report exclusively pertaining to charges that now had been brought on Juan de Somovilla for his mint project participation, so that the King could decide what resolution he wanted to take on this matter. It is on this preliminary report that we find the following:

The Diesinker, Alejo de Reina, testified that he did not know how much silver was minted or to whom it belonged. He further confirmed that no gold had been minted and said that after the decree for the closure of this mint office was received, the mint continued in operation for another 12 to 15 days using small pieces of broken silver and silver fragments (*cizalla*), and not the silver bars that he had received; bars which were said to have been returned to their respective owners. According to Alejo de Reina, after the period mentioned elapsed, the treasurer then ordered for the instruments (the dies) to be destroyed and he claimed that although he did not know when these instruments were returned to the officials of the Royal Treasury, he believed that from the moment that the mint was closed to the time when the dies were destroyed, a month went by. The accounts presented by this official would come into question later during the investigation, which discovered that on 22 April 1656, eight months and 17 days after the order to stop production had elapsed, this official had in fact accompanied the treasurer, Juan de Somovilla, to the Royal Treasury, where they delivered on that date: 15 defaced lower dies (*pilas*) and 30 destroyed upper dies (*troqueles*). With the knowledge that Alejo de Reina had not been completely honest in his testimony, the question of when the dies were destroyed or last used could not be settled. With this question not satisfactorily answered it was considered clear evidence that the mint had remained opened for at least two months since receiving the order from the King to close it down. But, without further evidence to confirm the exact date when mint production stopped, it could not be determine the actual date when the dies were last used, which could have been up to 22 April 1656, the date when they were turned over to the Treasury.

The scribe, Lorenzo de Soto, then testified that the treasurer was the one who bought (received) the silver pieces to be smelted, and that he did not take the accounting data or witness the arrival of this silver. He acknowledged having seen silver which belonged to the King brought to the mint, but did not know who brought this silver to be coined. He further complained that the treasurer was the one who did the smelting without notifying him, as scribe, and that he was not made aware of the amount collected for the “*feble*” (the *feble* reflected the profit obtained during the coining process), and he did not get involved in the assays, nor was he present when the seigniorage (*señoraje*) was collected. He also stated that through the entire time he served as scribe he was given only one book containing the accounting figures of what was given to the supervisors to be coined, so he could sign this book, even though he knew that the treasurer had others books as well. He also reported that the instruments were never destroyed in his presence.

Don Miguel de Somovilla Tejada, the Weigh Master and son of the treasurer, said that he did not know how many silver bars were brought to the mint to be

used for the coinage and that only in this form was the silver brought into the mint office. He also testified that he had no knowledge of what each bar weighed or what was taken out of them as his father was the one who kept the records. This corroborated what the scribe had testified, in that the treasurer kept the records and not the scribe.

All that Don Tomás Perosso, Main Guard of the mint office and helper, stated was that he was never given an appointment to exercise his post. But having an appointment in hand, or not, does not seem to have stopped this official from being present at the mint, as ledgers obtained during the investigation, which belonged to the treasurer, documented him as being present at the mint.

Cristóbal de Montemayor, custodian of the Royal Treasury of Cartagena (*defensor de la Real Hacienda en Cartagena*) and Tomás de Vega, Secretary of the Inquisition, had nothing to declare at the time. But earlier, on 26 August 1657, Tomás de Vega wrote to the Marquis of Montealegre to express some concerns about what he believed were frauds that were being committed during the salvage efforts of the *Nuestra Señora de las Maravillas* and at this time he did mention the issue of the Mint Office of Cartagena. He stated at this time that it had operated for more than two months (being what the Abelló de Valdés Investigation would later allude to). Tomás de Vega's statements, in conjunction with the allegations he presented about possible fraud being conducted with silver coming from the salvage of the wreck of the *Nuestra Señora de las Maravillas* has come to be interpreted as him making accusations that coins could have been minted in 1657 with silver coming from this shipwreck, and that these were probably predated 1655 to hide their illegal origin. But this assumption is incorrect. The only reason why Tomás de Vega was now mentioning the minting of coins in Cartagena, with this referring to the events that took place in 1655, is that he wanted for the Marquis of Montealegre to know that he believed that Governor Zapata was not a man whose alleged actions could be believed, as his disobedience of the King's orders regarding the minting of coins in Cartagena showed that he had no scruples. The opening sentence of Tomás de Vega's letter states: "What in the middle of this Governor Zapata has done it's not believable, he minted coins [in Cartagena] for more than two months after having orders from His Majesty to close the mint there." (*Lo que en medio de esto a obrado el Governador Çapata no es creyble, el Labro moneda [en Cartagena] mas de dos meses teniendo orden de su Magestad para çerrar la cassa de ella....*) (AGI: SANTA FE, 198, N. 16.)

José Fernández de Ortega, Attorney and Consultant to the Tribunal of the Inquisition of Cartagena (*abogado y consultor del Tribunal de la Inquisición de Cartagena*), declared that he received news that Marcos del Puerto, who arrived in Cartagena on 5 July 1655, brought a Royal Decree ordering the mint office not be opened, and if it had been opened that it would be closed down. With this the governor ordered for the mint office to be closed down and that this order was made public in Cartagena and that he was told by Manuel de Sanabria that after this event had taken place, that coins had been minted for the Holy See (*Santo Oficio*) and for Don Francisco López de

Zúñiga y Meneses, Marquis of Baides and Count of Pedrosa (whom had served as Governor of Chile from May of 1639 to May of 1646, and was present in Cartagena at this time).

A proceeding conducted later concerning the officials of the mint could not find in the books of the mint any recorded figures for the amount obtained from the seigniorage of the coinage minted in 1655 and although none of the mint officials that were questioned could remember the exact date the mint office opened, this event must have taken place on 21 June 1655, as this was the date previously documented by Lorenzo de Soto, scribe of the mint office, for when the first batch of silver was received at the mint, and now was being reconfirmed, through the mint book drafts (*borrador*) and books (*libros*) that were gathered during the investigation, which were said to have belonged to Treasurer Juan Somovilla Tejada, as the earliest date recorded for mint production.

During the investigation, each of these book drafts and books that had been gathered were carefully examined in an attempt to determine the accounting figures of the mint. The information from these ledgers was recorded as follows: (AGI: SANTA FE, 58, N. 12.)

- One book draft began by stating that between 17 July and 29 August 1655, the treasurer gave smelter Miguel Serrano a total of 10,414 marks and 5 ounces of silver in the form of bars and other pieces, and then, 22 pages later, it added that from 28 June to 4 September 1655 another 3,299 marks and 4 ounces in silver fragments (*cizalla*) were again given to the said smelter.
- Another book draft indicated that several accounts had been set up and then closed, but then it mentioned that 124,000 pesos had been received.
- Another book draft recorded the receipt of 83,300 marks of silver that belonged to inhabitants so that this could be minted into coins.
- Another book draft indicated that between 21 June and 10 August 1655, it was said that through Juan de Somovilla and Don Tomás Perosso, a total of 9,956 marks and 6 ounces of silver planchets were given to two supervisors (*capataces*) so that these could be coined, with this information being presented to Lorenzo de Soto, the scribe, for him to record it.
- And yet, another book indicated that starting on 24 June 1655 the coiners received 66,988 pesos which were not credited.

At the end Don Juan Abelló de Valdés could not find any evidence that any silver from the galleons of the Armada of the Marquis of Montealegre had ever been provided to the mint office to be coined, which was in contrast to one of the reasons given for the opening of the mint office, and there was also no evidence that the treasurer had ever given any accounts to the Royal Treasury of what he had minted.

Concluding the investigation against Juan de Somovilla, Don Juan Abelló de Valdés determined the following: (AGI: SANTA FE, 58, N. 12.)

- That he had exceeded his role without having a title dispatched to him in such manner.

- That he had admitted in front of the other officials that he had used his occupation and paid their salaries without them having the proper titles, or him having been sworn into the post he was holding.
- That being in charge of receiving all the silver that went through the weigh master in the presence of the scribe, as it was done in the other Spanish mints, and then having to pay the proceeds to those involved (*las partes*), with acknowledgment by the scribe, who was to record on the books these payments made, there are no records that this was followed and done, as the findings indicate that the complete opposite was done, such that it is not clear what was minted, which becomes even more problematic when it is taken into account the large amounts of silver that were being handled by the mint office, as was gathered from the books and other ledgers taken from the treasurer; documents which did not have any separate notation to what was taken for the seigniorage, nor can this be deduced due to the lack of clarity. But the one thing that could be determined was that not a single maravedi was given to the Royal Treasury.
- That he had asked for an extension to the time in which he was to close the office, and that although this extension had been properly granted, as evident from the large amount of silver that he still had at the mint office yet to be coined, that this extension elapsed and the 4th of August went by without any action taken. Also, since it was never documented the actual dates when the office started production or when it closed down, and that since the treasurer did not destroy the dies in front of the scribe and did not surrender them, or the instruments, to the Royal Treasury until eight months and 17 days later, that this further added credence to the statements gathered from the witnesses whom had already testified that the treasurer had continued production after the extension had expired.
- He is also found guilty of not recording a distinction between what silver should have been saved as *feble* and which was *cizalla*.

About the dies

It is clear that neither the Council of the Indies nor King Philip IV authorized a new mint at Cartagena; therefore, as expected, we found no record of them having sent dies for the 1655 production. So where did the dies come from? The dies must have been made locally in Cartagena. Surely diesinker Alejos de Reina must have been aware of the orders for coins to be of the “new design,” since these were proclaimed in Cartagena in September 1651 and that was the issue at hand. Despite the complaint that “not a single coin with the new design could be seen in Cartagena” he must have modeled after the new coins. By comparing the Cartagena 1655 coins with those of Potosí and Santa Fe we suggest that the dies were modeled after Santa Fe. The following page shows some pictures for comparison.

The four-real coins illustrated show the reverse (column side) is the same as Santa Fe except the pomegranate (symbol for Santa Fe) located between the crowns atop the columns and the “N” mintmark for Santa Fe (between the columns and above the ocean waves) have been replaced with crosses and PLVS VLTRA is spelled out completely instead of abbreviated.



Santa Fe 4R 1653 [3]



Cartagena 4R 1655 [4]

By comparing the designs of eight-real coins of Potosí and Santa Fe we infer that Cartagena chose to model after Santa Fe but omitted the pomegranate which is at the bottom of the shield.



Santa Fe 8R [5]



Cartagena 8R w/close-up Mintmark (C) & Assayer (S) [6]



Potosí 8R (Transitional) [7]



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NI

Klippe Albert R. Frey

A general name for coins struck on a square, rectangular, or lozenge-shaped planchet. They occur in various metals and in many instances are money of necessity.

The etymology is probably from the Swedish *Klippa*, to clip, or to cut with a shears. Some of the early bracteates present the appearance of having been cut with a pair of scissors, and Christian II of Denmark resorted to the practice early in the sixteenth century to such an extent that he received the nickname Kong Klipping.

(From *A Dictionary of Numismatic Names, Their Official and Popular Designations* by Albert R. Frey. 1917. New York: American Numismatic Society.)

NI

**A Provisional's Provisional
Azad Hind Counterstamp of India
Joseph E. Boling, NI #LM188
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[Originally prepared for exhibit at the ANA convention in 1985]

The Provisional Government of Azad Hind and the Indian National Army

On 21 October 1943 the Provisional Government of Azad Hind (P.G.A.H.) was established in Singapore under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose. Bose was a prominent Indian politician and nationalist who had been arrested by the British in India in 1940 (following unrest related to India's entry into World War II), but who had subsequently escaped to Germany. Following the Japanese victories in Southeast Asia, and with a desire to expel the British from India, Bose traveled to Japan. He established his new government with Japanese encouragement. He also created the Indian National Army (I.N.A.), a military organization composed of Indians trained to fight by and for the British, but who had surrendered to the Japanese at various places in the Pacific theater.

The I.N.A. fought in the 1944 campaign in eastern India; the cities of Kohima and Imphal were their objectives. The I.N.A. acquitted themselves reasonably well, but Japanese troops following the I.N.A., having suffered unexpected difficulties from both the British and the monsoon rains, did not provide the support expected by Bose (or by the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters). The British managed to hold Imphal and the I.N.A. units were forced to withdraw.

The I.N.A. had no further role in the war. What few troops survived the retreat back through Burma melted away, and the Army was officially disbanded when the Japanese lost Burma. Bose moved the P.G.A.H. from Rangoon to Saigon and continued to work for Indian independence, but he died in Taiwan on 17 or 18 August 1945 from injuries received in an airplane crash (the date varies with the reference consulted). Two years later India did become independent (without the territories which became Pakistan); Bose might have been an important world leader had he survived. He was commemorated on Indian postage stamps in 1964 and 1968.

Philatelic and Numismatic Emissions of the P.G.A.H.

The Provisional Government was recognized by several of the Axis powers, but never achieved enough stability to gain even an aura of legitimacy. One way to obtain public acceptance as a true representative of India's people would be to create postage stamps and currency—items typically issued only by central governments, and important symbols of sovereignty.

A series of postage stamps in six designs was printed for the P.G.A.H. by the German *Reichsdruckerei* (State Printer). They never reached Burma or India, and no postally used examples are known, but some entered the philatelic market after the war. A cruder stamp issue was printed in Rangoon and carried on the Imphal campaign. The stamps were printed on both sides and were meant to be used as either stamps or currency. A few are reported to have been used for postage; their use as currency has

not been verified and must have been limited at best. They are rare and extensively counterfeited; the original plates are said to still exist.

Toland reports that “Bose had bales of new currency ready for circulation” as the I.N.A. approached India in 1944. However, it is not clear whether this was truly Azad Hind currency or was the stamps mentioned above. It could also have been notes which the Japanese had printed for use in occupied areas (“Japanese Invasion Money,” or “JIM”). If it was actually P.G.A.H. currency, none has as yet been identified. Several note-like pieces once thought to be Azad Hind currency are now believed to be leaflets, or perhaps receipts for donations to the Azad Hind cause.

Coinage of the P.G.A.H.

Coinage is surely the most difficult fiscal item for a government to prepare, but also one of the most tangible symbols of governmental stability. The subject of this exhibit is a rupee of the Empire of India counterstamped with the letters “P.G.A.H. 1943.” The counterstamp is applied directly across the face of King George VI. A photograph of another piece shows the counterstamp obliterating the crown. Either application has interesting propaganda suggestions.

The use of a counterstamp greatly simplifies the production of coinage; neither expensive minting equipment nor complex preparation of planchets is required. Preparation of a counterstamp die is relatively simple, any suitable coin from circulation can be used as a planchet, and any convenient location can serve as a mint. But why bother? Paper money is almost as easy to prepare, and ever so much cheaper.



Figure 1 (Enlarged ×2)



Figure 2 (Counterstamp, enlarged)

The inhabitants of the Burma-India border region are notorious for preferring “hard cash” over paper currencies. Allied airmen carried gold coins in their emergency kits for use if they had to walk out from a remote crash site; paper dollars, pounds, or rupees would not do. Similarly, if the I.N.A. wanted to obtain goods and services along their route, and did not want to antagonize the locals by using expropriation as their currency, they would have to have something easily recognizable and accepted. What better medium than the local coinage, modified to add to the stature of the users and denigrate that of their enemies? Mr. Sengar reports that he has also seen this counterstamp on a Burmese rupee (Y-7, the peacock design). Either coin as a base piece would be recognizable and acceptable to the border-area residents; only the defacement might be a problem.

We do not know who prepared these coins, nor where or when. This piece and the one reported by Surana were prepared on 1942 rupees. The action of striking the counterstamp die on the obverse virtually obliterated most of the date and the word “India” on the reverse, but the date can be made out with a microscope or good glass. I have seen no dates reported for other pieces. The use of Indian coins dated only a year before the counterstamp was applied indicates that either the originator had access to some purloined Indian coins (perhaps seized from a shipment to a bank) or that the counterstamps were applied to coins found locally after the I.N.A. entered India.

Although these pieces may be modern fantasies, they seem to have the acceptance of the Indian specialists with whom I have discussed them. Only a few have been reported. The original information I received was that five had been retained by an I.N.A. officer for some thirty-nine years after the war before they reached numismatists. Another report, from a dealer, said that he had handled some and had three in stock.

No contemporary reports of P.G.A.H. or I.N.A. coinage have come to my attention, so the issue may have been prepared and not used. It is certain that the British would not have let such coins circulate after the war, but the piece exhibited appears to have circulated at least briefly. There is dirt in the counterstamp, and the raised areas

around it seem to be burnished from normal wear and tear. In any event, I am sure that the P.G.A.H. had better intentions, and did not regard this as a permanent coinage—but rather as a provisional's provisional.

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Update 2011: A 2005 book I have with an article about this counterstamp cites the same published Indian source that I cited, plus correspondence with a museum or two. The coin illustration is poor and the author does not show paper emissions. This 2005 source is: Manak, S.K., "Provisional Government of Azad Hind and Its Currency," in *Numismatic Studies (Volume 7)*, Manmohan Kumar, ed., Harman Publishing House, New Delhi 2005, pp 99-103.



Kushan Kingdom, Huvishka I

Jean Elsen & ses Fils, NI #2696

(Translated by Francisco Miller)



India, Kushan Kingdom, Huvishka (260-292), AV dinar, c. 287-292, Peshawar. 4th emission, 3rd officina. Obv.: Half-length bust of king I., holding scepter. Rev.: Goddess Ardoksho standing and holding cornucopia. Ref.: Goble, Kusan, 286; Mitch., ACW, 3196. 8.03 g. (Jean Elsen & ses Fils, 2011 Dec 10 lot 1554; images are not actual size.)

NI

The Crusading Kingdom of Cyprus

Richard Plant, NI #2736
© 2011, Richard Plant

King Richard the Lionheart was on his way to the Holy Land for the Third Crusade, with his fiancée Berengaria in one of the accompanying vessels, when the storm struck. Berengaria's vessel was wrecked on the coast of Cyprus. Cyprus was ruled by a Byzantine breakaway ruler called Isaac Comnenus, who was both cruel (he imprisoned Berengaria and her crew) and stupid (he didn't know much about Richard the Lionheart). Richard rushed over to Cyprus, and not wanting to delay his Crusade, conquered the whole island in just fifteen days. He married Berengaria in Limassol, and then rushed back to the Holy Land, where he tried to sell his new possession, Cyprus, to the Templars. As the Templars were too slow with the money, he just gave the island to Guy de Lusignan, who was still supposedly King of Jerusalem, though he had lost most of his territory to Saladin. So Guy now became King of Jerusalem (in name only) and of Cyprus, with his Kingdom of Cyprus lasting through until 1489, when the last Queen sold the island to the Venetians.



wikipedia: Crusader_States_1190

The following is not meant to be a complete list of the Lusignan Cypriot Kings, only of those with coins mentioned in this article.

Guy de Lusignan	1192-94	James I	1382-98
Henry I	1218-53	Janus	1398-1432
Henry II (with a little gap)	1285-1324	John II	1432-1458
Almaric of Tyre	1306-10	Queen Charlotte	1458-1460
Hugh IV	1324-59	James II	1460-1473
Peter II	1369-82		




Figure 1

Figure 1 is a billon denier of King Guy (Guido in Latin—remember that U is usually written as V in Latin). The obverse round the gateway reads REX GVIDO (King Guy) continuing onto the reverse with DE CIPRO (of Cyprus).




Figure 2

Henry I, another billon denier, has on the obverse HENRICVS, with his title REX inscribed above the doorway of the castle on the reverse.



Figure 3

Figure 3, of Henry II, is a silver gros, of a type which was to become the most commonly found coin for this series of kings. This was minted during the second part of Henry's reign, after his restoration in 1310. Earlier gros use the lion badge of Cyprus for the reverse design. Here, on this later gros, the reverse shows the Cross-and-Crosslets arms of Jerusalem. The legends read HENRI DEI / IERUSALEM E D' CHIPR' (Henry, King of Jerusalem and of Cyprus).

Almaric, Prince of Tyre, took over in Cyprus between 1304 and 1310, naming himself "Governor and Rector of Cyprus" and Regent of the Kingdom. On his gros

coins, between 1304 and 1306 he includes Henry as well as himself, but omits Henry altogether from 1306 till 1310.



Figure 4

Figure 4, a gros, is an unusual type for Cyprus. On the obverse, the outer circle first, we read AMALRIC' TIRENSIS DOMINUS CIPRI GUBNATO' E RE(C)TOR (Almaric, Lord of Tyre, Governor and Rector of Cyprus). On the reverse IRL'M ET CIPRI REGIS FILIUS (Son of the King [Hugh III, 1267-84] of Jerusalem and Cyprus). Note that "Jerusalem" can be spelled in various ways!



Figure 5

Figure 5 is a billon denier of James I "IAQVE" in Latin. The obverse has the Lion of Cyprus, with IAQVE ROI DE around, followed by I, the first letter of the IEIRVSALEM on the reverse.




Figure 6

Figure 6 is a silver gros of Queen Charlotte. The obverse shows a crowned shield with the arms of Jerusalem quartered with the lion of Cyprus, and the Latin legend translating as "Charlotte by the Grace of God Queen," and on the reverse the usual

Cross-and-Crosslets of Jerusalem, and her queenly titles of “Jerusalem and of Cyprus (spelled with an H).”



Figure 7

Figure 7 shows James II, IACOBVS(S), by the grace of God. And on the reverse “King of Jerusalem, Cyprus AND Armenia (Cilician Armenia).” This is a much more interesting design with the King on horseback rather than sitting tamely on his throne.

Note: Images are not actual size, for scale the coin of Henry II in figure 3 is 27 mm.

Test: Identify the following coins (their names are all on the list printed above).



Coin 1



Coin 2



Coin 3



Coin 4





Coin 5

Answers elsewhere in this edition.

NI

ITALY, Sicily—Norman King Frederick II: “Stupor Mundi” CNG



ITALY. Sicily, Norman Kings. Frederick II. 1197-1250. AV *Augustale* (5.30 g). Messina mint. Struck after 1231. •CESAR AVG °IMP ROM, laureate and draped bust right / +FRIDE RICVS, eagle standing left, head right, with wings spread. CNI XVIII, p. 197, 13; Kowalski group A (U4/A20); Spahr 98; Friedberg 134. (Images are not actual size.)

Frederick II Hohenstaufen, “Stupor Mundi”—“Wonder of the World,” was the most enlightened western ruler of the medieval world, and single handedly almost ignited a renaissance centuries before it took hold in Europe. Besides encouraging the study of the ancient world and improving relations with the Muslims (including negotiating free access to Christian holy sites in Palestine, where crusading armies were completely unsuccessful), his most concrete innovation was the initiation of a western gold coinage fully comparable to the gold coins of the ancient Romans. The clearly classical motifs proclaimed his inheritance of the legacy of the Roman emperors and were issued concurrently with the publication of the Constitution of Melfi, his codification of Norman law meant to follow the famous Roman law codes. The *augustale* was struck until 1266, and the coinage of Frederick's successors never achieved the standards of his brilliant reign.

NI

Depiction of the Alps on Punic Coins from Campania, Italy

Mark McMenamin, NI #2563

In a previous article (McMenamin 2011), I reported a medal showing the Jura Mountains north of Geneva. Gazing southward from Geneva this time, I present here evidence for an ancient image of the Alps (perhaps the earliest known) on a rare pair of Punic (Hannibalic) coins that were apparently struck during Hannibal's occupation of Italy.

The coins in question are outside of the usual series of Punic gold coins, and this has led to questions about their authenticity. This coin type does not appear in the classic reference on the series by G. K. Jenkins and R. B. Lewis, *Carthaginian Gold and Electrum Coins* (1963), and this should immediately arouse suspicion about their authenticity. European authorities are evidently divided on the question, with some suggesting that they are genuine, and others saying otherwise. Until now the two coins in question appear to be unpublished. I will provide evidence in this article that the coins are indeed authentic.

My purpose in writing this article is threefold. First, I will briefly describe the two coins. Second, I will present the case for authenticity. Third, I will briefly discuss the implications of these Punic coins should they in fact, as I suggest, show a tiny image of the Alps.

Both coins are tenth staters, bearing the standard Carthaginian devices for coins of this type, consisting of a palm tree on the obverse and a horse's head on the reverse (Jenkins and Lewis 1963). The first coin (Figures 1,2 and 3) is struck in what appears to be fairly pure gold, and the second is struck in a paler metal that may in fact be electrum, a gold-silver alloy. Three pellets arranged in a triangle appear to the right of the horse on the second coin. The number of pellets or dots on Carthaginian gold coins are known to indicate position of the coin in any particular coin series, with the later coins in the series typically bearing more pellets (Jenkins and Lewis 1963). Coins with more pellets, later in the series, are therefore generally struck from progressively debased gold. The three pellets on the second coin (Figures 4 & 5) implies that there may exist, or once existed, coins of intermediate gold content, with only one or two pellets to the right of the horse head, respectively.

A very curious feature of this coin pair is that the obverse with the palm tree is struck from the same die on both coins. This is an unusual feature for a gold-electrum Punic coin series, and assuming that these coins are authentic, would suggest such a tiny mintage for the series that the same obverse die was able to be recycled for the entire series. This may seem unlikely, but tiny mintages are not unheard of in Punic numismatics. For example, Jenkins-Lewis Group I and Group II, major groups in the Carthaginian gold and electrum coin series, are represented by only one and three coins, respectively, for a total (combining both groups) of only three obverse-reverse die pairings.

The coin design elements seen here are generally in accord with the general types of the Carthaginian tenth stater series, with two important exceptions on the obverse die. First, the date clusters on either side of the palm trunk consist of a triangular grouping of three pellets each as shown in the illustration. This differs from the usual case with

Carthaginian tenth staters, where the dates appear as a pair of round or elliptical clusters.

Second, to the left and behind the palm tree there appears a mound-shaped object with a flat base. I interpret this as a picture of a mountain, and propose here that this tiny prominence represents a Punic depiction of the Alps.

The styles of the horse head design on both coins are a bit unusual, but nevertheless well within the range of variation seen on Carthaginian coins known to be authentic. For example, the horse head on the second coin has somewhat camel-like facial features, similar to those of the coin seen in Jenkins-Lewis Plate 26, 3.

The mismatch in size between the mountain image and the image of the palm tree would be quite in accord with the interpretation presented here. The palm tree is a canting device or symbol for Phoenicia (Carthage) and its presence alongside a tiny picture of a mountain advertises the fact that such obstacles as the Alps will provide no real barrier for the advance of Punic civilization. This of course also represents Hannibal's successful occupation of Italian territory after crossing the Alps with elephants and an army, a feat that Hannibal's enemies evidently assumed was impossible. Hannibal's advice in this regard, in words attributed to him, was to "favor the unexpected solution." The exact route of Hannibal's army through the Alps remains a mystery that has intrigued historians for millennia (Connolly 1978; Mahaney et al. 2008). Unfortunately, the mountain icon on these coins is too small and stylized to provide much help in deciding the question of the exact route of Hannibal's troops. The triangular shape of the image does, however, invite comparisons to the Matterhorn which is situated some distance to the northeast of the route through Cenis Pass that is often proposed as the route of Hannibal's army, and thus implies a more northerly route. We might even imagine Hannibal himself urging on his troops by making reference to its pyramidal shape, as in: "behold how the African Pyramid now appears in Europe."



Figure 1



Figure 2

Gold tenth stater. Calabrian mint (Lokroi), under occupation by Hannibal. 212-209 BC; 0.848 grams, 10 mm. Alpine mountain peak is shown to the left of the left cluster of hanging dates. Note large eye of horse.

The image of the mountain is clearly an intentional design element of the coin rather than damage to the die, due to its intentionally engraved flat base. Also, the border of

dots on the obverse straightens out slightly as it reaches the mountain from the top of the coin, indicating that the die engraver was willing to bend the border slightly to provide somewhat more room for the mountain image.




Figure 3

Enlargement of the obverse of the coin shown in Figure 1, showing mountain peak image interpreted here as representing one of the peaks of the Alps.



Figure 4



Figure 5

Electrum tenth stater. Calabrian mint (Lokroi), under occupation by Hannibal.

212-209 BC; 0.946 grams, 9 mm. Obv: Note date clusters consisting of three pellets. The image of the Alpine mountain peak is struck partly off the flan to the left of the left date cluster. Rev: Note triangular grouping of pellets to the right of the horse's head.

The evidence seems to indicate that these coins are authentic, and authentically Punic, based on the following characteristics. First, the fabric of the coins appears to be authentically ancient, with relatively coarse radial flow lines seen in the luster as is typical for other Carthaginian gold and electrum coins. Also, edge cracks occur along the margin of the electrum coin that appear to be quite similar to edge cracks in ancient coins known to be authentic.

Second, the extremely fine to uncirculated state of preservation of both coins actually argues in favor of authenticity. During Hannibal's occupation Calabria/Taras in Italy, coins were struck for a relatively short time between 212-209 BC. For example, the 1/4 shekel struck (Figures 6 and 7) by Hannibal's mint at Calabria (SNG Cop. 369) is often encountered in uncirculated condition, indicating that these coins did not experience very much or any circulation. Perhaps they were hoarded or buried as Hannibal's army pulled out of the area. Attempting to spend such coins among the the native population after Hannibal's departure might have been less than prudent, to

say the least. The fabric of the two gold coins described here seem to be a closer match to an authentic Calabrian 1/4 shekel (shown in Figure 7) than it is to similar Punic coins struck at Carthage itself.



Figure 6



Figure 7

Silver Punic quarter-shekel, obverse view. Italian mint, under occupation by Hannibal. 212-209 BC; 1.9 grams, 13 mm (Ravel 1947 [as coin Vlasto 1880]; Golan 1995).

These features, plus iron oxide encrustations visible on the higher purity gold coin, could be the products of an elaborate hoax, and this cannot be definitely ruled out at this point. The weight of evidence currently favors authenticity. These coins appear to be part of a very small, and perhaps experimental (trial) mintage executed by a Carthaginian or Carthage-allied mint stationed in Italy. The rarity and small size of the coins suggests that not much gold was available to the Punic Italian mint, but that nevertheless the mint masters wanted to commemorate the Punic crossing of the Alps with a specially struck gold-electrum coin series. Perhaps minor amounts of gold were produced as a by-product of smelting metal for the far more extensive silver coin series.

If the hypothesis presented here regarding the authenticity and interpretation of these coins is correct, then they represent both a fascinating example of Punic hubris at having crossed into Roman territory via the Alps, and the most ancient known portrayal of the Alps in any medium.

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A New Spanish Civil War Republican Town Coin

Peter S. Horvitz, NI #2215

In November 1991, when the *NI Bulletin* published my article “Coins and Tokens of the Spanish Civil War,” I was aware of six Republican controlled towns that struck their own emergency coinage; l’Ametlla del Valles, Arenys de Mar, Ibi, Nulles, Olot, and Segarra do Gaia. I now believe that a seventh town can be added to this list. This additional issue was uncovered through a careful examination of the Catalan text of Antoni Lopez i Lluch’s *Les Monedes de les cooperatives catalanes* (Barcelona, 1983). The issuer of this coin was the *Ajuntament* (city council) of Mora la Nueva.

The municipality of Mora la Nueva (or Mora la Nova in Catalan) is in the hills directly west of the City of Tarragona, in the Province of Tarragona. In the 1930’s it had a population of over 2,000. Today its population is over 3,000.

The listing of the town of Mora la Nueva in Lopez reveals that some time before the Civil War the *Cooperativa Ferroviaria* (Cooperative of Railroad Workers) issued a token valued at 10 céntimos. This token (Lopez 2701) measures 31 millimeters and was struck in brass. The obverse has the words COOPERATIVA FERROVIARIA around MORA LA NUEVA. At the bottom is a six-pointed star between two dots. The reverse has a large 10 above CÉNTIMOS.

During the Civil War, the Ajuntament of Mora la Nueva, due to the severe shortage of small change, ordered that examples of this token issue be countermarked with an incuse five pointed star at the top of the reverse and that they be circulated as currency within the confines of the town. This stamped issue is listed by Lopez as 2703.

There are other instances known of such restriking during the war, but this is not the coinage that I am claiming as a new Republican Civil War coinage. The original, uncountermarked 10 céntimos tokens are listed by Lopez as “E” (*escasa*) for scarce. The countermarked issue is listed as “R” (*rara*) or rare.



Figure 1
10 Céntimos, 31 mm

The stamping of the 10 céntimos tokens with a star and the circulating of them within the town did not fulfill the purpose of ending the small change shortage. So the ajuntament took another step. It ordered the striking of 5-céntimos pieces (Lopez 2702), exactly like the 10 céntimos, except for the denomination and for the reduced

size of 25 millimeters. These brass pieces were also marked with the 5-pointed star. These pieces do not exist without the star. It does seem strange that the star was not included in the design of these 5-céntimos pieces, rather than requiring the countermark, but it may have been felt that they would then differ too much from the 10 céntimos in appearance and that they would then seem to lack the mark of authenticity which the star provided.

It is these 5-céntimos pieces that I am now claiming as town issued coins. They were struck with the authority of the town to serve within its limits as currency. It is true that they bear the name of a cooperative, but their countermark was meant to indicate their legality as circulating coins. They were never used or intended to be used as tokens by the Railroad Workers, as the 10-céntimos pieces were originally used, but only as emergency coinage.

Lopez lists these 5-céntimos pieces as RRR, or of the highest rarity.



Figure 2 (Enlarged ×2)
5 Céntimos, 25 mm

NI

The Crusading Kingdom of Cyprus

Answers to Coin Identification Test

- 1) Gros of John II
- 2) Billon “Sixain” of Janus
- 3) Gros of Hugh IV
- 4) Gros of Almaric of Tyre naming Henry II (minted 1304-6)
- 5) Gros of Peter II


Alfonso IX of León, Gold Maravedi
Jean Elsen & ses Fils, NI #2696
 (Translated by Francisco Miller)



Spain, León, Alfonso IX (1188-1230), AV maravedi (morabetino), Salamanca (?). Obv.: + ALFON [...] SVS [...] DEI [...] GRACIA [...] REX B. crowned left, holding a cross scepter between two stars. At right, a vertical sword. Reverse: + IN NE [...] PATRIS [...] I FLI [...] I SPS SCI lion passant to right. Below, a row of five arches in two columns. Ref.: A.B., 112, Fr., 47. 3.76 g. (Images are not actual size.)

Alfonso VIII (1158-1214) was the first king of Castile, who struck a gold coin known by several names: maravedi, morabetino, alfonsino or dobla. His example was followed by King Sancho I of Portugal (1185-1211) and the Kings of León, Ferdinand II (1157-1188) and Alfonso IX (1188-1230), who also struck gold coins. Until the 12th century, Arabian gold coins of the Almoravids circulated extensively in Spain, including in the territories under Christian rule. The arrival and the rise to power of fanatical Almohads in Islamic Spain brought about the end to the circulation of Arab gold coins. Christian kings then decided to mint their own gold coins. The popular names of their currencies (maravedi and morabetino) were derived from the name of the Almoravids (or Murabiti). The maravedi of Alfonso VIII were imitations of Arab coins, but bore Christian legends in Kufic script. Those of the Kings of León are a type featuring the bust of the king on the obverse and his heraldic emblem on the reverse. They were probably struck in Salamanca because we know that Ferdinand II bestowed the Cathedral of Salamanca a third of the income of the coinage of gold in the city. The arches shown on the reverse under the lion could represent the Roman bridge which is also on the seals of Salamanca in the 13th century.

NI



Ionia - Origin of Coinage

CNG



IONIA, Uncertain. Circa 650-600 BC. EL Stater (14.52 g). Milesian standard. Striated type. Flattened striated surface / Two rough incuse punches separated by a cleft. Cf. Weidauer 5 (trite); *Traité* pl. I, 12 = BMC Ionia p. 183, 1; Triton VII (13-14 January 2004), lot 242; Classical Numismatic Group 67 (22 September 2004), lot 701; cf. Rosen Collection (*Münzen und Medaillen* 72, 6 October 1987), lot 1 (horizontal striations). (Images are not actual size.)

Other than the literary tradition ascribing the origin of coinage to the kings of Lydia, there is little evidence for a more exact chronology of early Greek coinage. The tradition, buttressed by limited archaeological studies, does confirm Asia Minor as the place of origin, most likely Lydia or Ionia, and a date somewhere around 650-625 BC. The alloy used, a mixture of gold and silver known to the Greeks as *elektron*, was based on the natural ore found in nugget form in many river-beds in the region. The earliest coins were of a globular shape and without design in imitation of this natural form; later, simple striated and punched patterns of squares, rectangles and swastikas were included. The earliest true types may have developed from the use of personal seals, the most widely known being the stater of Ephesos with a stag bearing the inscription "I am a seal of Phanes." These devices later took on the characteristics of civic symbols, although it would be hazardous to link a specific symbol to a particular city in this early period. The most secure form of classification has been by weight standard, based on two major, and several lesser-used, standards. The Milesian standard, with a stater of circa 14 grams, saw circulation in Lydia and parts of Ionia. The Phokaic standard of circa 16 grams was also used in Ionia as well as Mysia. Persic, Aeginetan, and Euboic standards saw scattered use in early coinage, limited in time and extent of circulation. The intrinsic value of the early electrum, even down to the 1/96 stater, was too high for use in everyday commerce, and early coinage must have been used only for the transfer of large sums of money, such as mercantile transactions, payment of government expenses (mercenaries, tribute and such), and donatives, either for services rendered to individuals or the state, or to religious foundations. The Artemision deposits, hoards of early electrum found at the site of the temple of Artemis at Ephesos, are examples of the latter.

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NI Bulletin Article Contest Winners 2011

For 2011 we have winning articles in each of the two categories, Feature Article and Short Article. (The short article category is for 500 words or less.) It is our pleasure to recognize the authors of these articles published in the NI Bulletin.

We had many fine articles in 2011 making final selections difficult. However, after much consideration I chose the following articles for the Editor's Choice Awards.

The winner of the Best Original Article in the Feature Article category is John E. Sandrock for his article "Bank Notes of the French Revolution, Part I: The Royal Assignats." It is an informative, interesting and very readable article concerning finances and money associated with the French Revolution. If you've not yet read it I suggest you go back and do so.

The winner of the Best Original Article in the Short Article category is Dennis Gill for his article "Menelik Trial 1 Birr EE1888A (1896)." In this short article Dennis illustrated and described trial strikes that shed light on a yet *unsolved mystery* in Ethiopian coinage.

Both of these winning articles appeared in the November / December 2011 *NI Bulletin*. As editor I commend our winners for their contributions to numismatics and I enjoy the privilege of placing their work in the pages of the bulletin.

I encourage all of the membership to support NI by telling your friends about us and giving them an application form. You can get the form by writing NI at the Dallas address, or print it from the NI website www.numis.org. You can even apply on-line at the website.



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A limited number of complete sets (6 volumes) of my books *The Coins of Independent Peru* (1821-1935) are still available. These books are a standard reference set in English. Also, an (almost) complete run of *World Coins* magazine. Reply to hpflatt@aol.com or Horace Flatt, 7831 Park Lane, Apt. 235C, Dallas, TX 75225.

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